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Abstract
With the rise in popularity of machine and deep learn-
ing models, there is an increased focus on their vulnera-
bility to malicious inputs. These adversarial examples drift
model predictions away from the original intent of the net-
work and are a growing concern in practical security. In
order to combat these attacks, neural networks can leverage
traditional image processing approaches or state-of-the-art
defensive models to reduce perturbations in the data. De-
fensive approaches that take a global approach to noise re-
duction are effective against adversarial attacks, however
their lossy approach often distorts important data within the
image. In this work, we propose a visual saliency based ap-
proach to cleaning data affected by an adversarial attack.
Our model leverages the salient regions of an adversarial
image in order to provide a targeted countermeasure while
comparatively reducing loss within the cleaned images. We
measure the accuracy of our model by evaluating the effec-
tiveness of state-of-the-art saliency methods prior to attack,
under attack, and after application of cleaning methods. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach in
comparison with related defenses and against established
adversarial attack methods, across two saliency datasets.
Our targeted approach shows significant improvements in a
range of standard statistical and distance saliency metrics,
in comparison with both traditional and state-of-the-art ap-
proaches.
1. Introduction
With increased adoption of machine and deep learn-
ing models into critical systems, adversarial attacks against
these models have proportionally become a growing con-
cern. Adversarial examples have been demonstrated in
a growing range of applications, not only in classifica-
tion tasks, but also in malware detection[9] and recog-
nition of speech and audio[19]. In the physical world,
models used in facial recognition systems [20] and au-
tonomous vehicle interpretations of traffic signs, road pat-
terns, and pedestrians [12] are also susceptible to these dis-
torted inputs. Adversarial attacks, such as fast gradient
sign method (FGSM)[8], iterative FGSM (I-FGSM)[11],
Carlini-Wagner’s L2 (CWL2)[3] and DeepFool[15], take a
broad range of approaches toward a similar goal: drifting
a targeted model away its original intent through a series
of malicious inputs[1]. Attacks can be categorized as tar-
geted or non-targeted, describing their intention of mislead-
ing a model toward a specific desired outcome or generally
causing it to incorrectly interpret the input. Additionally,
attacks may be white- or black- box, if the adversary has
prior knowledge of the underlying model, training informa-
tion, or system. In this work, we focus on black-box non-
Figure 1. Comparison of CPD[24] on cleaning measures of
ECSSD[21] data attacked with FGSM[8]. Top row: Original im-
age, ground truth saliency map; Bottom row from left (defenses):
bit-depth reduction, JPEG compression, SHIELD[4], SAD.
targeted attacks to images, in an attempt to provide defense
for general machine learning models against a range of at-
tacks. We leverage prevalent defense measures, identifying
approaches that take a global approach to removing distor-
tions as well as recent localized approaches. Ultimately, we
propose a new defense strategy, SAD, which uses regions of
interest to strategically reduce adversarial distortions. Fig-
ure 1 motivates the effectiveness of our proposed approach,
comparing the saliency maps of an adversarial example im-
age after application of bit-depth reduction, JPEG compres-
sion, SHIELD[4], and our proposed SAD model. Some de-
fense techniques, including bit-depth reduction and JPEG
compression, use a globalized approach to clean the inputs,
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while other techniques, such as SHIELD [4], use a more lo-
calized approach in reducing distortions. Both types of ap-
proach have demonstrated performance against adversarial
attacks of image classification models, however it is diffi-
cult to ensure preservation of the data integrity.
While ROI region selection can be prohibitive on a
perturbed image, some visual saliency models have been
proven effective despite adversarial attack. [7]. In Figure
2, an image from ECSSD[21] dataset is shown with a gen-
erated saliency map, prior to and after a FGSM[8] attack.
Note the reduction in salient region identification in the up-
per leaves of the image, however the overall content remains
correctly identified.
In this work, we propose a novel defense technique based
on visual saliency. The proposed approach identifies a re-
gion of interest (ROI) and leverages a saliency map to apply
targeted cleaning techniques. In demonstration of our pro-
posed method, we evaluate the performance of state-of-the-
art saliency models on established saliency data under the
following conditions: original data, attacked by FGSM and
DeepFool, and finally cleaned by four methods. We discuss
the impact of the choice of saliency estimation approaches
in the effectiveness of our defense solution, and recommend
augmentations for future improvement.
2. Related Work
Among all the different cleaning techniques, we di-
vide them into two major categories: globalized techniques
and localized techniques. Globalized techniques, includ-
ing methods such as bit-depth reduction and JPEG com-
pression, have proven to be successful in reducing the ef-
fectiveness of adversarial attacks through the use of rel-
atively simplistic approaches. Bit-depth reduction limits
the color in an image, which reduces distortions and there-
fore the effectiveness of the adversarial attacks. However,
while bit-depth reduction impacts general perturbations, it
can also damage core features used to identify salient in-
formation. JPEG Compression can also be used to reduce
the effectiveness of malicious input by compressing the im-
age. This causes malicious inputs to get smoothed out,
but at the same time introduces unwanted artifacts. These
unwanted artifacts can have unexpected consequences in
saliency generation. While each technique has a unique way
of approaching the problem, they all reduce overall num-
ber of features within the data. However, these globalized
techniques are predictable and thus can be easily circum-
vented. Related to globalized approaches, distillation has
also been demonstrated by Papernot et al as a viable means
of defending against adversarial examples in deep neural
networks[17]. Magnet[14] takes a cryptography-based ap-
proach to defending against adversarial examples. Built for
gray-box attacks, this defense is randomly selected from a
set of precomputed methods at runtime. Beyond globalized
approaches, there are more localized approaches, such as
image quilting [6], watermarking and SHIELD [4]. Inher-
ent randomness in these techniques makes them difficult for
the adversarial attacks to circumvent.
We present a unique method that reduces the effective-
ness of adversarial attacks while preserving original con-
tent, and demonstrate its viability by examining the saliency
of the images prior to attacks, under attacks, and after de-
fenses.
3. Saliency-based Adversarial Defense (SAD)
In response to the need for a targeted defense measure
against diverse adversarial inputs, we propose a Saliency-
based Adversarial Defense (SAD) approach outlined in Fig-
ure 3. Our model estimates relevant regions of interest
(ROI) in an input and strategically applies countermeasures
against adversarial perturbations.
Figure 2. Consequences of adversarial attack on ECSSD data [21]
predicted using PiCANet [13]. Top row: original image, Bottom
row: FGSM attack [8]
3.1. Model Description
In order to select the most relevant ROI, our proposed
model leverages a model for visual saliency estimation.
First, a saliency map is generated for the input image. Our
implementation uses PiCANet [13] trained on the DUTS-
TR dataset [23]. Once a map is generated, JPEG compres-
sion is applied at differing qualities based on the saliency
predictions.
Figure 3. Overview of SAD
In addition to the images to be processed, a list of com-
pression level must be passed as a parameter to our model.
This list will be denoted as Q, where Q(i) denotes the ith
compression level. Much like SHIELD [4], each image pro-
cessed is segmented into 8×8 windows. Wij is used to de-
note the window at the ith row and jth column of the image.
The saliency map, taken as a grey-scale image, is identically
segmented into 8×8 windows. Each window in the saliency
map is assigned a scalar value, from 0 to 255, based on the
average saliency prediction of all pixels within the window.
These scalar values, denoted as Salij , are then divided by
a threshold and used as an index into Q. The compression
level C for Wij can be expressed as the following equation.
C(Wij) = Q(
⌊
Salij · |Q|
255
⌋
) (1)
The goal of this approach is to reduce the effectiveness
of an adversarial attack while minimizing damage done to
the ROI.
This technique is similar in nature to SHIELD [4], with
the primary difference being the replacement of a random-
ized compression algorithm with a saliency based com-
pression algorithm. Figure 4 provides an example input,
saliency prediction and output that demonstrates compress-
ing the background significantly more than the salient parts
of the image. In this example, the output has salient re-
gions compressed at 90% while non-salient regions are
compressed at 20%.
4. Experiments & Results
In this section, we first review the extensive setup of
datasets, adversarial image generations, adversarial de-
fenses, and evaluation metrics used in this work. We then
specify the series of experiments performed, and demon-
strate the performance of our proposed approach in the final
section.
4.1. Setup
Two popular saliency datasets, ECSSD [21] and SALI-
CON [10], were chosen for experimental setup, due to their
Figure 4. Example input and output of SAD. Top down: Original
image, Saliency prediction, Output.
prominence recent saliency research and their degree of dif-
ficulty. The Extended Complex Scene Saliency Dataset
(ECSSD) [21] is comprised of complex scenes, present-
ing textures and structures common to real-world images.
ECSSD [21] contains 1,000 intricate images and respective
ground-truth saliency maps, created as an average of the la-
beling of five human participants. The Salicency in Context
(SALICON) [10] is a similarly complex dataset, chosen in
this work to provide a broader range of scenes and a larger
number of samples. SALICON [10] contains a training set
of 10,000 images and their respective ground-truth saliency
maps as well as a validation set of 5,000 images with their
corresponding ground-truths and was designed to purpose
of evaluating current saliency models with natural scene im-
ages. In addition to ground truth saliency maps, this dataset
provides fixation maps for analysis. For our experiments,
we selected only the training set of SALICON [10] to eval-
uate the saliency models, for a total of 10,000 images on
this dataset.
Two adversarial attacks were chosen in this work, for
their prominence as well as diversity in approach. We lever-
aged FGSM [8] and DeepFool [15] attacks to evaluate the
efficacy of our proposed countermeasure. The Fast Gradi-
ent Sign Method (FGSM) [8] was chosen as it is a more
traditional attack which has proven to be effective in creat-
ing input images which are significantly misleading to pop-
ular convolutional frameworks. The inclusion of FGSM [8]
allows us to test the effectiveness of saliency models and
cleaning algorithms against a well-known and common ad-
versarial attack. DeepFool [15] was chosen as it is consid-
ered a state-of-the-art attack against image-based classifica-
tion models, with a more robust attack surface. As each of
these approaches requires an objective function to consider
in their attack, we chose a common VGG16[22] backbone
and pretrained this model using the ImageNet [5] dataset.
In defense against the adversarial examples, we selected
three countermeasures in comparison with our proposed
SAD approach: bit-depth Reduction, JPEG-compression,
and SHIELD. [4]. We chose these as a balance of global
and localized defense techniques, for a robust compari-
son with our proposed approach. Both bit-depth reduc-
tion and JPEG-compression are established countermea-
sures to defend against adversarial attacks, effective in re-
ducing the number of perturbations present within the im-
ages. For the purposes of our experiments, we used a 3-bit
depth reduction and a compression level of 80 for JPEG-
compression. The recent Secure Heterogeneous Image En-
semble with Localized Denoising (SHIELD) [4] uses a ran-
domized compression levels to reduce the number of per-
turbations present within the images.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our defense,
we put all images - original, adversarial, and ”cleaned” -
through state-of-the-art saliency models, and evaluate the
performance of each model. As these models have demon-
strated top performance on these popular saliency datasets,
we can establish how they are affected by the adversar-
ial inputs. In this work, we selected three diverse models
to generate saliency maps for the images: BASNet [18],
CPD [24], and SalGAN [16]. The Boundary-Aware Salient
Object Detection model (BASNet) [18] uniquely leverages
edges and bounding boxes to help establish a saliency map
for an image. The Cascaded Partial Decoder (CPD) [24]
model incorporates a holistic attention mechanism into the
traditional encoder-decoder framework. The Saliency GAN
(SalGAN) [16] model is a generative adversarial network
approach, providing discriminator and generator models in
adversarial training. It is important to note that SalGAN
[16] was mainly designed with to generate saliency maps
based on eye-fixations rather than a basic saliency map.
Finally, we leverage saliency metrics in this work as
an evaluation of the effectiveness of our proposed defense.
The MIT Saliency Benchmark [2] provides established met-
rics for saliency estimation models, on both binary saliency
maps and fixation maps. For the purposes of this work,
in application to only ground truth maps, we selected
Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD), Pearson’s Correlation Co-
efficient (CC), Normalized Scanpath Saliency (NSS), KL-
Divergence (KLD) and similarity score (SIM).
4.2. Experiments
To establish a baseline, we generated the saliency
maps for the ECSSD and SALICON datasets using the
BASNet[18], CPD[24], and SalGAN[16] saliency models.
After establishing a baseline, we then took each dataset
and performed separate FGSM and DeepFool attacks on
the images. In uniform comparison, all attacks leveraged
a VGG-16 common backbone. The same saliency models
were used to generate saliency maps of each set of these
attacked images.
Finally, all attacked images were cleaned using a se-
ries of adversarial attack defenses. We started by perform-
ing a bit-depth reduction on the attacked images, reducing
the images to a 3-bit color representation. Next, we per-
formed a JPEG compression on the attacked images, com-
pressing the image quality by 80 percent. Once we fin-
ished the JPEG compression, we performed the state-of-
the-art defense SHIELD on the attacked images. SHIELD
functions takes JPEG compression but instead applying a
uniform image compression level, the compression is ap-
plied in patches, randomly determining the quality reduc-
tion of the image. We took the new images from all the
current cleaning techniques and then fed them into all of
the saliency models to get their respective saliency maps to
use for the metrics. Once we had all of the saliency maps,
we then ran all of our metrics on the cleaned images to show
how the cleaning techniques affected the saliency maps.
Finally, using the same experimental guidelines, we per-
formed SAD on the attacked datasets. Testing was per-
formed with 2 lists of compression qualities (20, 50, 70,
70, 80, 90) and (50, 70, 90). The cleaned SAD images were
then run through the same metrics in order to make a di-
rect comparison of our technique and other modern clean-
ing techniques.
4.3. Results
Figure 5 provides a collection of images picked from
ECSSD[21]. The first two rows of the figure contain the
original image and its respective ground truth. The third
row contains the saliency map generated by BASNet[18]
from an FGSM[8] adversarial example. In this figure,
FGSM[8] is shown to cause minor distortions to the
saliency maps that were generated by BASNET[18]. The
following rows contain the resulting saliency map from the
bit-depth reduction, JPEG-Compression, SHIELD[4] and
SAD respectively. These rows demonstrate the highlight
the effects that each cleaning technique has on the saliency
map generation.
Table 1 shows the results of running the BASNet[18] vi-
sual saliency model [18] against the SALICON[10] dataset.
Tables 2 and 3 show metric results of running
BASNet[18] and CPD[24] respectively on the entire
ECSSD[21] dataset. In each of these cases we conclude that
SAD performs significantly better on global attacks, such
as FGSM[8], than localised attacks, such as DeepFool[15].
This is because more distortions are present in the non-
salient regions of global attacks, thus more distortions are
removed overall. We posit that for localised attacks on
ECSSD[21], while SAD performed worse than standard
JPEG compression, the difference in performance is com-
paratively small. Figures 6 and 7 are min-max normalised
graphs presented to visualise these results.
Table 4 shows metric results of running CPD[24] on the
SALICON[10] dataset. In this case, because CPD[24] does
not perform well on this fixation based dataset, the overall
results do not vary much between the original, attacked, and
cleaned examples.
In general, DeepFool[15] has little to no effect on
saliency prediction as is illustrated by Figure 8. In this fig-
ure we see only slight difference between the original, at-
tacked and cleaned saliency predictions. This result is fur-
ther backed up by the metrics of DeepFool[15] across all
tables.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
With adversarial attacks increasing in popularity and
constantly evolving, new defenses are continuously being
counteracted by new methods of attack. In this work, we
presented a new method for defense against adversarial im-
ages which is based upon visual saliency estimation. In
comparison with existing localized and global approaches,
our method is a strategically applied defense. Our targeted
approach demonstrates better reduction of adversarial dis-
tortions while preserving salient content of the original data.
Our proposed SAD model outperforms existing counter-
measures in a range of standard saliency metrics.
While SAD has been proven effective, there are still
Figure 5. Comparison of BASNet[18] on cleaning measures of
ECSSD[21] data attacked with FGSM. From top: Original image,
ground truth, Attacked, BitDepth, JPEG, SHIELD[4], SAD
many different areas to explore. In future work, we will
look to optimize saliency thresholds as well as the back-
end saliency model, to further improve the results of SAD.
Further analysis of the effectiveness of our model will be
explored in comparison with a growing number of state-of-
the-art defenses on additional saliency datasets, and can be
analyzed in terms of the classification of images across sim-
ilar phases - before attack, during attack, and after cleaned.
Data: SALICON, Model: BASNet EMD ↓ CC ↑ NSS ↑ KLD ↓ SIM ↑
Original 83.60872647 0.4218207896 0.3761202097 10.67353916 0.4060104787
FGSM 79.91393103 0.4087593555 0.3648214042 11.35947323 0.3891682327
DeepFool 83.60636636 0.4222988188 0.3763460219 10.67110252 0.40616256
FGSM + Bit-depth Reduction 75.04985629 0.3049599528 0.2969438136 13.31941891 0.3179412484
FGSM + JPEG80 Compression 79.73553778 0.4079829454 0.3639315665 11.40826893 0.3880238533
FGSM + SHIELD 79.44973525 0.4092005491 0.3637762368 11.43848801 0.3876400888
FGSM + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 79.25510666 0.4074067175 0.3620625138 11.51703453 0.3857473135
FGSM + SAD (50 70 90) 79.89621414 0.4122531116 0.3667055368 11.30664825 0.3907471597
DeepFool + Bit-depth Reduction 78.72886619 0.3303083181 0.3210006058 12.43772602 0.3442973197
DeepFool + JPEG80 Compression 83.44919726 0.421741128 0.3755041957 10.72119999 0.4052546024
DeepFool + SHIELD 83.24127967 0.4230029285 0.3759891391 10.71790504 0.4055115879
DeepFool + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 83.10682231 0.4206542075 0.3742873669 10.78884315 0.403165251
DeepFool + SAD (50 70 90) 83.54616027 0.4241522551 0.3771335781 10.64822292 0.4069490135
Table 1. Evaluation of the BASNet[18] visual saliency model[18] on the SALICON[10] dataset.
Data: ECSSD, Model: BASNet EMD ↓ CC ↑ NSS ↑ KLD ↓ SIM ↑
Original 48.07041578 0.9120191336 1.979211807 1.506018996 0.8843896985
FGSM 45.51845167 0.8434635997 1.829114914 3.207652092 0.8040903211
DeepFool 47.9678527 0.908826232 1.972466826 1.60269177 0.8807195425
FGSM + Bit-depth Reduction 41.21447617 0.5987574458 1.297375202 8.744916916 0.5463407636
FGSM + JPEG80 Compression 45.44040079 0.8403670192 1.823511362 3.267945766 0.8005516529
FGSM + SHIELD 45.26718383 0.8304385543 1.805399299 3.560398102 0.7886587977
FGSM + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 45.35846763 0.8506878614 1.85140121 3.170518398 0.8131732941
FGSM + SAD (50 70 90) 45.93143812 0.8615031838 1.87408042 2.825253487 0.8248550296
DeepFool + Bit-depth Reduction 43.46246487 0.6593744755 1.430215001 7.15671587 0.6113178134
DeepFool + JPEG80 Compression 47.933426 0.9080747962 1.97224772 1.61575985 0.8803170323
DeepFool + SHIELD 47.71402123 0.8999755979 1.953188896 1.781389356 0.870287478
DeepFool + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 47.33478719 0.9016960859 1.960625887 1.858531952 0.8717075586
DeepFool + SAD (50 70 90) 47.77355919 0.9041004777 1.961497784 1.685516238 0.8761977553
Table 2. Evaluation of the BASNet[18] visual saliency model[18] on the ECSSD[21] dataset.
Figure 6. ECSSD [21] attacked with FGSM [8] generated by BASNet [18] (min-max normalized)
Data: ECSSD, Model: CPD EMD ↓ CC ↑ NSS ↑ KLD ↓ SIM ↑
Original 48.28455886 0.9043654799 1.964785576 1.253266454 0.874347806
FGSM 45.36623833 0.8253191113 1.793251872 3.001737833 0.7846102118
DeepFool 48.16762985 0.9003679752 1.957540512 1.323252082 0.8697779179
FGSM + Bit-depth Reduction 37.93778128 0.5365927815 1.133271813 9.139689445 0.4919550121
FGSM + JPEG80 Compression 45.04148904 0.8208998442 1.786798239 3.14307785 0.7796351314
FGSM + SHIELD 44.63645556 0.8076060414 1.756557226 3.521080494 0.7643808722
FGSM + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 44.82445048 0.816835165 1.78500545 3.504522562 0.7739418745
FGSM + SAD (50 70 90) 45.2943999 0.8305669427 1.812999964 3.0791049 0.7902354002
DeepFool + Bit-depth Reduction 40.7708216 0.62786448 1.342035532 6.702296734 0.5820772648
DeepFool + JPEG80 Compression 47.96485411 0.8997527361 1.956662774 1.369203806 0.869066
DeepFool + SHIELD 47.49587288 0.8849500418 1.92660892 1.676331162 0.8517687917
DeepFool + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 47.21730354 0.8871904016 1.92954421 1.74879241 0.8548846841
DeepFool + SAD (50 70 90) 47.65713406 0.892139554 1.939523816 1.546016574 0.8613493443
Table 3. Evaluation of the CPD[24] saliency visual saliency model[24] on the ECSSD[21] dataset.
Figure 7. ECSSD [21] attacked with FGSM [8] generated by CPD [24] (min-max normalized)
Data: SALICON, Model: CPD EMD ↓ CC ↑ NSS ↑ KLD ↓ SIM ↑
Salicon 84.03098486 0.464445889 0.4046932757 9.461788177 0.4308495224
FGSM 77.17695558 0.4409204125 0.3802604973 10.84904957 0.3955992162
DeepFool 83.99931418 0.4644609392 0.4047108293 9.465325356 0.4308281243
FGSM + Bit-depth Reduction 71.81423414 0.3703564703 0.344774574 11.47888279 0.3569065928
FGSM + JPEG80 Compression 76.72632067 0.43930161 0.378226012 10.95398521 0.3932281733
FGSM + SHIELD 76.17508536 0.4379900992 0.3765870929 11.05368805 0.3907161355
FGSM + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 76.01439047 0.4356130958 0.3746709526 11.19257164 0.3878324628
FGSM + SAD (50 70 90) 76.42406584 0.438691169 0.3776216805 11.02315617 0.3915502429
DeepFool + Bit-depth Reduction 76.45489553 0.416684866 0.3889657855 10.1579113 0.3980270326
DeepFool + JPEG80 Compression 83.7110553 0.4636833072 0.4037819207 9.535971642 0.4293003976
DeepFool + SHIELD 82.80526771 0.4643773437 0.4027466178 9.67798233 0.4266972542
DeepFool + SAD (20 50 70 70 80 90) 82.65074847 0.4604454637 0.3989365101 9.831030846 0.4227913916
DeepFool + SAD (50 70 90) 83.29619378 0.4635473192 0.4021643996 9.622299194 0.4274015129
Table 4. Evaluation of the CPD [24] visual saliency model[24] on the SALICON[10] dataset.
Figure 8. Comparison of SalGAN[16] on cleaning measures of
SALICON[10] data attacked with DeepFool[15]. From top: Orig-
inal image, ground truth, Attacked, BitDepth. JPEG, SHIELD[4],
SAD
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